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I  N F  0  R M A T I  0  N  (Competition) 
EUROPEMBALLAGE 
A DOMINANT  POSITION  CONDEMNED  BY  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
On .D.ecember  9,1971  the Commission  of the European  Community~  took a  decision 
prohibiting a  merger which had  been carried out in 1970  between  two  firms specialising 
in light  met~~lic packagings,under the auspices of a  holding comyany.named  "Europemballage 
which handles  the European activities of the American corporation "Continental Can". 
The  two  firms  in question are  the  German  firm Schmalbach  and  the Dutch  firm 
Thomassen  and Drijver-Verblifa,which also controls the Belgian compaQy  3obemi. 
According to the Corr_"lission, the Sc.luralbach  company, which has a  dominant  position 
in an  important part of the W4rket  for light metallic packagings for meat  preserves, 
charcuterie,fish and  shell-fish,has abused  t~s position by  limiting the freedom  of 
choice of its customers  to an extent incompatible with the Treaty,by acquiring control 
of the Dutch  firm,which is the leader in this specialty,both in the Netherlands and  in 
Belgium. 
Abusive  extension  of~domi~~positl.on 
.  ThE;  fac::t to which  the Commission  takes exception is,  essentially,  the extension 
into Benelux  of the domina.r.t  position held by  Schmalbach in the German  market.  'l'he 
abuse  to which  the verdict relate::;,  arises through the fact that the merger  of the  wo 
firms,\thich wake  the saua  range  of products and  are therefore competitors,  results :i.n 
practice, in restricting the customer's freedom  of choice. 
The  position arrived at by  the two  merger  firms is such that,in the oarket for 
their ~~incipal specialties,  buyers are virtually obliged to become  customers  of the 
Europe  •.  ~:.allage group,o111ing  to their inability to obtain supplies elsewhere. 
The  concentration thus infringes one  of the essential principles of competition 
in the  Collimon  I'.arket  - that any buyer  should have  a  free  ct.o~i.ce of supplier. 
!~~gal_bas~§_fQr_th~_QQF.~ssign~~ 
ggQ.i§iog 
~'he aim  and  desire of the Euro:9ean  Community  to guarantee  "fair competi  tion
11 
was  important enough  to be  mentioned in the  preamble  to the Treaty of Rome.  A few  IJages 
later,  the article in \·lhich  the Corr.rilunity  objectives are set out .foreshadows 
11  a  system . 
to ensure  ti.1a t  competition inside the  Common  i•::a.rket  is not  falsified 
11
•  Further on, in 
Article3 85  and 86,the Treaty of Roue  assigns to the Commission  the duty of  ~intaining 
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~  the state of competition in the Common  Harket,  and  gives it:  legal instruments to prohibit 
on its own  authority,  agreements  between  firms,State aids and  the abuse  of dominant 
~  positions. 
For Europerp.baliage  ,  the Commission  decision is based on  Anticle 86, wLich  is 
directed against the abuse of a  dominant  position which  a:ny  firm, or group  of firms, 
maY  l~ve in the market  for products in its own  special line,when similar or substitute 
products.are scarce or do  not exist. 
The  first prohibition,issued in July 197l,was against  the abuse  of a  dominant 
position in Germany, by  the authors and  musical  composers'  protection society GEMA.  It 
was  directed only against certain discriminatory practices.  In the l:..'uropemballage 
prohibition,against the acquisition of control of Thomassen  Drijver-Verblifa,  the 
commission is making its first incursion into the field of  bi~ industrial groups,many 
of which are  of recent foi'rilli<;ion.  In the present case,the Commission  takes  the view 
t!J.at,quite apart from  any aggressive intention,silch as a  dumping  campai£:,'71  or Widuly 
high prices,  abuse  may  exist in the mere  fact that buyers will,in practice,  be  forced 
to take  their supplies from  the merger  undertaking. 
'l'he  abuse  be6ins at the moment  when  the freedom  of cnoice of the consumer is 
first compromised.  In the case of E.'uropemballage, this threshold 1.ou.ld  be  crossed 
at the moment  of the acquisition of Thomassen  Drijver-Verblifa. 
In the case of Continental Can,  the Commission's  view  is  ti:J.at  "the purcha.se 
of a  majority sha..reholding in a  competing undertaking by  any  firm,or group  of firms, 
may inc ertain circUmstances constitute an abusive  ex1lloitation of this ,.osition". 
ihe circumstances referred to,require that one  of t£1e  firms  should, before  the 
merger,  be  in a  dominant  position in an  important part of  th~ market.  i'hey  also 
require  that the  two  firms  shou.ld  offer a  competing line of  ~roducts,which was  indeed 
the case  of 3chmalbach and '.J.'homassen  .i.Jrijver-Verblifa.  ·.;,'hey  also require that, in the 
market  uncier  consideration - the huge  and  veri diverse ;:oarket  for packagings -
users s".ould  find  themselves  in difficylty in obtaining supplies of similar,or 
substitute, products from  other firms in the Community  or elsewhere. 
A study of the Continental Can  stry.ctures in .S\J.rofe ~of competing Corwnuni ty and 
foreign compa.nies,and  an  exrunination of substitute products,led the Commission  to 
the conclysion that Continental Can  satisfied the necessary pre-conditions for 
abusive exploitation of a  dominant  ~osition. 
In the case of .Suropemballage,  the Commission  took Lito account  the part of 
t:ne  market  dominated by  the parties to  the concentration;  but it also considered 
other elements  by  ••hich its judgement  might  be  confirmed.  'l'he  chief of these were 
- the size of the undertaking,by com:parison  with competitors in the ~  and  abroad 
- its high teclmological level  ; 
- the geoora11hical distribution of its production facilities which, since  they  cover 
a  wide  terri  tory  ,give it an important advantage in trans..:::·ort  costs  ; 
its international fina.ncing,which gives it wide  access  to capite.! markets 
- its production of conditioning machinery adapted to gToup  packaging  ; 
- the small degree of com:t;eti tion from  substitute l>roducts. _,_ 
Thus,apart from  the share of the market held by  1\tropemballage,  the inducement 
to the Community  to take action lay in the financial and  technological structure of 
the concentration. 
The  11uropean  structures of Continental Can 
~~  ~_er~~  co~:·' Continental  C~,with its subsidiary Continental Can 
International Corporation,·is the world  leader in the production of metallic 
packagings.  It is also an  important producer of paper and  plastic packagings.  The 
group has  200  factories,employs 62,000 people and  has a  turnover of $ 1,780 million, 
of which,  more  than 17  fo  is in external markets. 
The  Company  has majority.or minority shareholdings in some  30  companies  outside 
its own  country.  It has entered into  lice~ing and technical assistance agreements 
with 51  companies. 
In the  ~uropean Community,Continental  Can  holds 85.8 %  of the capital of the 
German  company  Schmalbach-Lubeca  werke  of Brunswick.  This company  is itself the biggest 
metal packaging producer in Germany  and  in the Community.  'rhe  takeover dates from 
1969. 
At  this time  the group  already had  links with companies  operating its licences 
in the Netcterlands  and  in France.  It held 10.4 'fo  of the capital of the Dutch  company 
Thomassen  an~ Drijver-Verblifa and 8.1 ~of the French company  J.J. Carnaud et ~orges 
de  Basse-Indre. 
'l'he  affair begins with the formation in the USA  in l970,of\the holding compa.Dy 
l!.:uropemballage, which was  to take over and  expand  the assets of Continental Can  in 
Europe,consisting of the 85  %interest in the German  company  Schmalbach  and  the 
10.4 ~ interest in the Dutch  company  Thomassen  Drijver-Verblifa.The expansion of the 
holding company  was  to be  promoted  by  an agreement with Metal  Box,the leading British 
company  in the packaging business,  which  was  to have  brought in the Super  box  company 
in Italy,which is under its control,as well as a  minority shareholding in Thomassen 
Drijver-Verblifa. 
In parallel with this, a  takeover offer sent by  ~uropemballage to Thomassen  and 
Drijver-Verblifa  shareholders,~ was  to bring this company  into the.group.  It is the 
leading company  in its line in Benelux;  and  the Europemballage holding company  would 
thus have  comprised  production units covering  a  large part of the Community  (except 
!'ranee) and  in England,with ramifications in Austria and  the Netherlands .Antilles. 
The  Commission's first intervention 
In ~~rch 1970,the Commission  sent a  warning note to the companies,putting them 
on  notice that the operations contemplated might  be  regarded as incompatible with the 
Community  doctrines on  competition. 
Shortly after this, Metal  Box  stated.that it would  not be  giving effect to the 
project,and therefore would  not  be  contributing to 1Uropemballage as arranged. 
Nevertheless,the  operatio~without the British participation, was  carried 
through on  April 8,1970.  '!he  final result was, that Europemballage held 91% of 
Verblifa,  86 %of Schmalbach,but  only 1.3% of Superbox,which remained  under the 
control of the British Metal  Box  group. -4-
The  f!~  merged  i~-~~opemballage 
Schmalbach Lubeca  ••erke  AG  of Brunswick is the biggest light-metal packaging 
pro~cer in continental  ~urope. Since 1956,the group has absorbed several 
German  manufacturers and holds 45  %  of the capital of a  Belgian firm.  It has 
a  subsidiary in Austria. 
Thomassen  and  Drijver-Verblifa of Deventer is  the  biggest metal  packaging 
manufacturer in Benelux.  In 1964  the group merged  with Sobemi  3.A.,the 
biggest Belgian manufacturer in this line. 
There is insufficient  competiti~n from  substitute  prod~~ 
The  Commission  adds  a  further argument  to its decision,by stating that the 
competition of substitute products cannot be used by  buropemballage  to justify 
the  takeover. 
The  basic production,both of Schmalbach and Verblifa 1 consists of light 
metallic  packagings in tinplate,uncoated metal or aluminium,which represent 8o-88% 
of the turnover for each of them.  These  consi3t of cans,boxes and  containers for 
dry products,  aerosol containers,  metallic closures and  other products. 
'fl'_e  range of products ofiered by  Continental Can  and  i \:s  licensees  (inchlding 
5,000 products by  the ScrilllB.lbach  comp~t alone) fully covers the great majority of 
the requirements  of  the entire packaging sector for meat  preserves,charcuterie, 
fish and shell-fish. Horeover,  in ti10se  marhet  sectors in which  the group  has  a 
very important position,there is practical~ no  similar or substitute product. 
:ii'or  all these reasons  the Commission  considered it was  in a  ::;;osition  to require 
Continental Can  to put an end  to the situation created by  the merger  between 
3chmalbach anci  j,'omassen  and  Drijver-Verblifa and, for this purtJose, to r;;ake  proposals 
before July 1,1972. 